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Abstract
In this paper, we present an agent based model of the banking system, including
banks households and a central bank. The model is able to address some relevant eco-
nomic issues regarding liquidity shocks, shocks on assets, inequality wealth distributions
and herding effects. By analyzing the effects that different policy configurations have on
the system, we show that capital requirements are more effective than cash reserve re-
strictions in order to guarantee the robustness of the banking system. However, in case
of high economic instability, liquidity requirements become ineffective. Also, we find that
when the central bank is acting as a lender of last resource, capital requirement regulation
becomes irrelevant, or even negative for economic growth. We also show that inequal-
ity among households wealth has a negative effect in both stability and growth. Finally,
the model confirms that panic and herding among households accelerates the banking
system breakdown.
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Capital and Reserve Requirements to Control LIquidity Shocks:
An Agent Based Perspective
1 Introduction
Economic literature regarding the banking system has increased considerably in the last
decade. The financial crisis of 2007 has been a natural experiment on a global scale that
scientists and researchers around the world have not missed, and whose results and evi-
dences have undermined the foundations of economic analysis.
The causal origin of the crisis is difficult to determine, however, most economists coincide
in pointing out some factors such as i)the underestimation of risk arising from the sale of
hard to value assets (most of them derived from the sub prime mortgages), ii)the increasing
interconnectedness of global financial markets and iii) the growing degree of banks leverage
in the years before the crisis,(read Gorton 2008, Blanchard 2009, and Brunnermeier 2008, for
an exhaustive revision)
Although in many circles the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 is considered to be
the official beginning of the crisis, first clear evidences were presented in August 2007, with
the bankruptcy of some smaller US investment banks; a consequence of a contraction of a
housing market deeply affected by the sub-prime mortgages. The proportion between cause
and effect revealed a financial system more fragile than previously thought (Krishnamurthy
2009). In numbers, a relatively small reduction on assets, which is estimated to be 250$
Billions according to International Monetary Found (FMI), unleashed a diminution of global
output and wealth approximately 100 times bigger, reaching valuation of $26.400 billion in
November 2008 (Blanchard 2009).
But the relevance of these facts has a scope that goes beyond the numerical approach. In
recent years, a debate on the state of macroeconomic theory itself has been opened. In the
words of Krugman (2011), macroeconomics has entered a Dark Age. This way, the general
consensus between society, policy makers and researchers advocated by some authors (Galí
& Gertler 2007; Goodfriend & McCallum 2007; Taylor 2007) concerning the contingency rules
recommended for each possible scenario has been broken.
Before the Recession, most economists defended that "the practice of monetary policy
reflects the application of a core set of scientific principles"(Mishkin 2010). With the advent
of the crisis, these principles of the New Neoclassical theory (Goodfriend & McCallum 2007;
Woodford 2009) have been questioned, and thus the models that are built on them, the so
called current Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. The basic postulates
of mainstream DSGE models, which include perfect rationality, complete markets, perfect
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competition, etc. as well as the representative agent (RA) approach, have shown unable to
construct models capable of explaining the basic phenomena underlying the systemic crisis.
Moreover, the possibility of such event is even ignored. As a consequence there is a growing
number of front line economists claiming that the "economic crisis is a crisis for economic
theory"(Kirman 2010, Colander et al. 2009, Krugman 2009, 2011, Caballero 2010, Stiglitz
2011, Kay 2011, Dosi 2012, DeLong 2011).
Regarding the financial system and its regulation, it is common to find strong differences
of opinion among authors answering questions such as whether the system should be regu-
lated and what the optimal regulation might be. Once again, these discrepancies are strongly
related with the mainstream axioms that each researcher wants to give as valid. Regulation
only makes sense in environments with market failures such as externalities, non perfect com-
petition or information asymmetries. Therefore, it stands to reason that authors basing their
researches on hypothesis on the line of the seminal paper of Arrow & Debreu, consider the
"laisezz-faire" the best policy (see Dowd 1996, Benston & Kaufman 1996).
For the rest, even assuming the existence of imperfections in the financial market that
justify its regulation, there is no consensus about the nature of these market failures. However
there are two arguments that are usually present in order to defend bank regulation: the risk
of a systemic crisis and the asymmetry of information.
The role of liquidity providers leave Banks exposed to runs (Diamond & Dybvig 1983).The
reason is that banks are forced to manage a balance sheet where the net value of their assets
(after discounting the liquidation costs) is less than the potential liquidity requirements by the
depositors. In this scenario, the expected value of a subject’s deposit depends on his position
in the bank line at the time of withdrawal because of the first come, first served rule. Under
these circumstances a run can occur even when there is perfect information about the bank’s
balance sheet. For instance, in a panic situation, depositors will try to withdraw their founds
just in case other depositors might do so first, thus forcing a reliable bank into bankruptcy
(Santos 2001).
Asymmetry of information opens the door to an additional source of runs: the filtration
of information on the value of banks’ assets (Jacklin & Bhattacharya 1988). In this sense,
a release of information proving the bad quality of assets owned by a bank could be positive
since it is a source of discipline that shall encourage a careful treatment of assets. As opposed,
if the trigger of the run is the panic or the existence of asymmetrical information, the effects
will be negative because bank will be forced to liquidate the assets prematurely being forced
to take both the opportunity and the fire-sell cost.
In order to shed some light over those complex situations this paper presents a basic
Agent Based Model (ABM) and its computational implementation focused on the analysis of
the effects of liquidity shocks. The model is built around families, banks and a central bank.
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Households act via deposits or withdraws in their banks as petitioners or suppliers of liquidity
on the system. The banks for their part, are able to capitalize their assets at an exogenous
growth rate and have to manage their balance sheet structure. Structures with too much
liquidity will mean lower profits as a consequence of having less profitable assets. On the
contrary, structures which are too much leveraged will certainly be more profitable but will
lead banks into bankruptcy more often. In any case they must comply with the balance sheet
composition rules determined by the financial policies represented in the system.
In short, this simple artificial economy allows us to experiment with different sets of policies
through capital and cash requirement in different characterizations of the economy. We pro-
pose to study the effects on the fundamental variables of the model of some key features as
the distribution of wealth of families, the implementation of herding mechanisms or the intro-
duction of a central bank (CB) in the system that performs the role of Lender of Last Resource
(LOLR).
It is worth noting that simulations provide a double value: First, experiments could be
used as a data generating process. Through different set-ups we can generate large amount
of data in order to study a particular aspect of our interest, applying appropriate statistical
techniques to the output of the simulation. This can be useful if we have few empirical data on
the phenomenon we are interested in or if we want to generate specific scenarios in order to
isolate a particular set of variables to study.
Second, real-time executed and monitored experiments allow an intuitive understanding of
the dynamics regarding the studied phenomena. On the one hand, this gives the researcher
a certain instant feedback when designing the experiments. On the other hand, the possibility
to interact with the model in a simple and intuitive way confers a great explanatory power,
which makes it suitable for educational purposes. Appendix B shows the appearance of the
graphical interface.
Conclusions drawn from this work aim to serve as validation of the model opening the door
to future extensions and applications in the field of analysis of the financial system through
ABMs.
2 State of the Art
Much of the literature on the role of banks as liquidity providers rest on the seminal papers
of Bryant (1980) and Diamond & Dybvig (1983). In their work, they present a model where
depositors must choose between withdrawing money or leaving their deposits in the bank. In
this research framework there is only one short-term asset that provides liquidity and another
illiquid long-term asset that provides greater profitability. The model presents a dual Nash
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equilibrium, either depositors withdraw according to their needs of liquidity trying to exploit
the higher return of the long-term assets, or fear seizes the system and depositors decide to
withdraw money regardless their needs, the so called Bank Runs. As a result the bank is
forced to liquidate their long-term assets facing a fire-sell cost and paradoxically the situation
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that justifies the initial distrust. This conceptual framework
is commonly used to justify tools such as deposit insurance or total or partial suspension of
the convertibility. These regulation tools are used to tip the balance towards the efficient Nash
equilibrium (see Wallace et al. 1990, Chari et al. 1989, Selgin 1993, Cooper & Ross 1998,
Goldstein & Pauzner 2005 for a deeper treatment).
It is only necessary a brief review to realize that within the IMF, there is only a minority of
countries that have not undergone profound financial problems in recent decades (Lindgren
et al. 1996). So, given the importance of the problem, a well-nourished line of research has
been developed following the theoretical approach proposed by Diamond & Dybvig. Based on
their findings, some authors have pointed the deposit guarantee scheme as a preventive tool
against pure-panic runs (Bryant 1980, Jacklin & Bhattacharya 1988, Alonso 1996, Bougheas
1999, Chen 1999), while others have defended the partial suspension of convertibility as a
more effective practice (Gorton 1985a, Chari & Jagannathan 1988).
In parallel of these investigations, other works based on the historical analysis of the crisis
have been developed to try to understand the origin of liquidity crisis and how to prevent them.
Again, many authors focus their attention on two particular formulas: either a partial or total
suspension of the convertibility complemented with the implementation of a clearing house
or deposit insurances (see Gorton 1985b, Gorton & Mullineaux 1987, Calomiris 1989, 1990,
Calomiris & Gorton 1991 etc.).
Moreover, recent studies are being developed in more modern lines of investigation like
network analysis and experimental economics.
In the one hand, the goal of social network analysis applied to financial networks is to
investigate these structures through the use of network and graph theories. This approach
represents networked structures in terms of nodes (banks, households, or other agents in-
volved in the network) and the relationships that connect them. Many investigators applying
these techniques coincide in the existence of a trade-off between two opposing effects: risk
sharing, which is decreasing with network connectivity and systemic risk, which oppositely
increases with interconnections (See Allen & Gale 2000, Thurner et al. 2003, Iori et al. 2006,
Battiston et al. 2007, 2012, Tedeschi et al. 2014).
On the other hand, bank runs have been studied following experimental methods.The na-
ture of this branch of the economy, rather focused on understanding the behaviour of the
subjects, explainse the fact that most of the papers develop models with a single bank, in the
line of the original approach of Diamond & Dybvig (see Duffy et al. 2008, for an exahustive
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review on laboratory research). Nevertheless some researchers have also developed models
with more than one bank in order to investigate the determinants of financial contagion (see
for exaple Chakravarty et al. 2014). This work is part of a third way that is being developed
in parallel with the ones mentioned above: the so called agent-based models. The iteration
between these three disciplines, expands the boundaries of economic study and offers alter-
natives able to model phenomena that are not contemplated in DSGE models. As regards
bank runs and the different instruments that could help to prevent them, the flexibility of ABM
allows policy makers to test the consequences that different regulations could have on the
economy.
For example Ashraf et al. (2011) have developed an ABM adjusted to American reality
where heterogeneous firms interact with banks. At the same time, banks are subject to dif-
ferent capital and loan regulations. The Simulations show that banks behaviour is clearly
related with the possibilities of the economy to get hit by occasional crisis. But on the other
side, banks are presented as economic stabilizers facilitating the integration of new compa-
nies thus minimizing inconveniences of bankruptcies. Hence, it is concluded from this work
that laxer regulations may favour faster recoveries from crisis. Notwithstanding that, Raberto
et al. (2011) through the EURACE model supports the fact that lower capital adequacy ratios
could generate short-term growth but also points that in return, increased stocks of private
debt endanger the long-run economic stability.
Due to the shortcomings of DSGE models, many economists argue that some economic
aspects should be attacked from other angles different to those provided by the neoclassical
theory. In this sense, ABM strive to characterize more realistic models borrowing frameworks
of interaction between agents from the network analysis, but also microeconomic and be-
havioural evidence from empirical and experimental economics. In these models, the assump-
tions of perfectly rational expectations are replaced by bounded rationality and behavioural
adaptation, assumptions that best fit the scientific evidence derived from the work of cognitive
psychologists (See for example Kahneman & Tversky 2000). Findings from network theory1 as
well as the profound heterogeneity that characterizes real economic agents involved in finan-
cial markets invites us to abandon too simplified theoretical frameworks as the representative
agent assumption or the idea that economic systems are in equilibrium. Focusing this way on
the study of out-of-equilibrium dynamics resulting from interactions between heterogeneous
agents. Summarizing, ACE is a multidisciplinary science that studies economies thought as
complex evolving systems computationally modelled(Tesfatsion 2006).
Compared with standard DSGE models, ABMs represent "a very powerful device to ad-
dress policy questions in more realistic,flexible and modular networks" (Fagiolo & Roventini
2012). Thus, ABMs present some advantages in both, theoretical and empirical frameworks.
1See for example Albert & Barabási 2002
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At a theoretical level, ABMs do not have to be configured as models mathematically solv-
able, hence too strict consistency requirements are not necessary. This feature, allows re-
searchers to abandon the assumptions of equilibrium or rational expectations and in their
place, empirically plausible assumptions could be implemented in a modular way. This mod-
ularity makes possible to completely modify or partially retouch these hypothesis easily if the
model does not conform expectations. This characteristic supposes a clear difference from
DSGE models where the replacement of a hypothesis such as rational expectations leads to
a new model that could not even have analytical solution.
Empirically, as pointed above, ABMs could be used as generators of alternative universes.
Moreover, their modular structure makes easier to make them fit the data via: input and output
validation. Through input validation we could modify assumptions about behaviours or inter-
actions to make them resemble the observed ones. Through output validation, it is possible
to restrict the space of parameters and specifications of the model to those that better explain
the stylized facts of interest.
Summing up, in order to retain analytical resolvability, DSGE are traditionally constructed
to explain a few stylized facts2 while ABMs can account for many empirical evidence at the
same time. Thus, we can point out among the many advantages of the ABMs, their flexibility
and modularity as well as a wider explanatory potential and a higher capacity of reproducing
empirical data.
This overview would not be complete without mentioning some issues often attributed to
ABMs. One of the main criticisms of these models is the loss of control over what is really
happening in the simulations. But this is somehow natural, since the ABMs are conceived to
explain really complex phenomena. Under the assumption that it is feasible to approximate
the problem in a mathematical and more analytical way, computational economy would not be
necessary.
A second very controversial downside among the community of experts is that ABMs
are frequently over-parametrized, in order to imitate as much as possible the described re-
ality. In this sense, some authors argue that many times ABMs rely on agents whose be-
haviour depends on many free parameters. Others downplay the issue by stating that the
over-parametrization problem can be solved through input calibration processes that might
reduce the free parameters of the model.
A third problem that we can label as the "initial conditions problem" appears when trying
to represent non ergodic processes through ABM. It is important to understand that the ABMs
could be interpreted as artificial stochastic data generation processes (DGP) that should be
able to mimic the real one generating empirical observations. In this sense, and supposing
2See Aoki 2006, for a detailed discussion
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non ergodic models, the initial conditions take a relevant role, and it arises the question of
how far back in time one has to go to identify the correct initial set-up for the main variables. A
last but not least issue is the problems found when trying to compare simulated and real-world
data. Using ABMs as DGPs allows us to obtain as many artificial realizations as we like, but
frequently we will only have a few empirical realizations, which makes it difficult to compare the
natural DGP with our artificial one. As a counterargument it is worth mentioning that when we
try to model a fact it is possible to expand our empirical observations using data from different
sources, territories, moments of time, etc.
In general, these problems are far from solved and represent the source of many discus-
sions among the specialized community. The intensity of these debates shows that behind
this new paradigm there is a passionate community that has no doubt of the great potential of
these new models.
3 The model
This paper investigates a partial model of the economy consisting of M banks and N house-
holds. Initially, households hold a fraction of his wealth in cash and the rest as a deposit ac-
cording with their preferences. In each period families choose to withdraw or deposit money
from the banks. Banks are represented by a basic balance sheet structure and are forced to
fulfil certain capital and liquidity restrictions.
3.1 Households
Families are the engine of the model as they are responsible of the the endogenous liquidity
shocks. Deciding between deposit or withdrawal, households force banks to restructure their
balance sheets to meet their demands of liquidity. High levels of demand may push banks to
suffer liquidity crisis, or even lead them to bankruptcy.
3.1.1 Households Characterization
As the model is focused on banks performance, households are mainly characterized in func-
tion of the exogenous parameters of their banks. Other household specific features that are
considered, are the distribution of wealth among families and their preferences between cash
and deposits. The wealth (Wit) of each family at certain time t = 1, · · · ,T consists of two parts:
cash (Cit) and deposits (Dit) that household has at a particular time.
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The percentage of wealth that households prefer to hold in cash form is represented by
the parameter c, which could be interpreted as the models’ version of the Keynesian liquidity
preference.
Wit = Cit +Dit (1)
Dit = (1− c)Wit (2)
Cit = cWit (3)
As there are Nj households at bank j, the average deposit of each household is an Nth
part of the bank deposits.
D¯jt =
Dj
Nj
(4)
Initial average wealth of households is obtained combining equations (2) and (4)
W¯j0 =
D¯j
(1− c)Nj (5)
In order to analyse the impact of different distributions of wealth, the initial endowment of
each household is distributed as a normal3 with mean W¯j0 and σ times the mean, standard
deviation.
Wij ∼ N(W¯jt, σ W¯jt) (6)
Thus, with σ = 0 wealth is distributed uniformly or what is the same, initial endowments of all
households are equal to average wealth. Higher values of σ allow us to represent scenarios
with deeper inequalities. For instance with σ = 0.5 wealth is initially distributed as a normal
distribution which mean is the average wealth and which standard deviation is half this value.
3.1.2 Households Behaviour
The specifications concerning dynamics of demand for liquidity by families have been mod-
elled trying to avoid too restrictive assumptions. Two parameters characterize this behaviour:
p which is the probability a household has to choose to withdraw in this period and α, the
percentage of their current wealth that families deposit or withdraw. Due to restrictions im-
posed by equations (1),(2) and (3), this simplified behaviour is summarized by the following
rule: Each period, with probability p households choose to withdraw min(Wit, Dit) and with
probability (1− p) deposit min(Wit, Cit). In plain words, if a family chooses to ask for liquid-
ity, it will withdraw a percentage α of his wealth as long as it has deposits to withdraw. If it
has not got enough deposits, then it will withdraw all the remaining founds. In the same line,
3To describe inequality in a more realistic way a fat-tailed function would be more appropriate. However, this
first approach enables the model to represent different initial endowments of wealth which allows us to draw some
qualitative conclusions about the effect of inequality.
10
when households choose to deposit and αWit is higher than the remaining cash, they will just
deposit all the remaining effective. To model trends when deciding whether to withdraw funds,
which are a characteristic feature of the bank-runs, it has been implemented a basic herding
mechanism where withdraw probability in a period (pt) depends on how much households
deposit or withdraw founds on the previous period.
3.2 Banks
Banks are the key element of the model, their decisions concerning balance sheet composition
can have a relevant impact on their financial robustness. Also, the capability of banks to meet
capital and liquidity constraints play an important role: on the one hand these restrictions
impose minimum cash and equity levels that have important effects, as it will be shown in
this paper and, on the other hand, compliance with these requirements will open the door to
liquidity injections from the lender of last resort (Central Bank).
3.2.1 Balance sheet structure
Banks are represented by a basic balance sheet structure divided in Assets and Liabilities.
On the left side of the balance, we have non liquid Assets (A) and Liquidity (L), the right side
is represented by households Deposits (D) and bank Equity (E) as shown in Figure 1
Assets Liabilities
A D
L E
Figure 1: Balance sheet structure
Each period, bank j faces an aggregate net withdrawal demand (ωj,t), consisting on the
present sum of net withdrawal requests (wi,j,t) of their clients. If a household presents a
negative wi,t it means that in this period this family is depositing cash in the bank, while
positive values mean that families are retiring deposits.
ωt,j =
N∑
i=1
wi,j,t (7)
Banks can only satisfy the demands of families with the available reserves, so it is neces-
sary to compare demanded with available liquidity. We define4 Kt as the difference between
available liquidity (Lt) and the aggregate withdrawal demand(ωt).
Kt = Lt − ωt (8)
4As the dynamics are repeated for each bank, we will focus on the characterization of the single agent. In this
way we facilitate the understanding by eliminating the subscript j of all equations.
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This way, if in a period the aggregate withdrawal demand (ωt) exceeds the available Liquidity
(Lt), banks will not be able to handle households‘ requests and will be forced to sell as many
assets as necessary to cover the difference. As opposed, if Lt is higher than ωt, cash demand
can be normally attended. Therefore, it seems clear that banks will need no liquidity if Lt > ωt
and if not, the liquidity shortage will be equal to the difference Lt−ωt or what is the same Kt.
Thus, the need for liquidity can be modelled as a function δ(Kt):
δ(x) =

0 if x ≥ 0
x if x < 0
(9)
To cover this lack of liquidity , banks are forced to sell illiquid assets facing a fire-sell cost
(l) represented in the model as a percentage of the book value of the sold assets. Hence, the
asset variation in each period due to liquidity shocks is represented by the expression:
∆Alt =
δ(Kt)
1− l
If liquidity is enough to cover demand then δ(Kt) = 0 and no assets are sold. In shortage
situations δ(Kt) > 0 and represents the demand that bank could not cover with actual liquidity
so ∆Alt assets must be sold to cover the shortage.
The dynamic equations that define the balance sheet model for each bank in function of
their liquidity demands is:
At+1 = At +
δ(Kt)
1− l (10)
Dt+1 = Dt +Kt − Lt (11)
Et+1 = Et + δ(Kt)
l
1− l (12)
Lt+1 = Kt − δ(Kt) (13)
As banks can only monetize a fraction (1− l) of their assets condition
Kt
1− l < A
l
t
must be fulfilled to assure that banks do not reach negative assets. The interpretation is
simple, banks cannot sell assets that they do not own hence the liquid value of their illiquid
assets is constrained for this condition.
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3.2.2 Characterizing Banks
In order to simplify bank characterization, the balance sheet components that define bank
typology are determined through three parameters. The first one is the initial Equity over
Assets ratio 0 = E0/A0, which is the level of capital requirements accomplished in t = 0.
The second determinant is the initial cash reserve ratio defined as γ0 = L0/D0 that defines
the fraction of deposits that the bank is keeping as liquidity reserve in t = 0. The last initial
parameter is banks’ total assets (TA), which is a measure of their size. Basic relationship
between balance sheet endogenous variables is:
TAt = Et +Dt = At + Lt (14)
Operating on the last equation on t = 0 we could obtain the following initialization equations
for our endogenous variables:
A0 = TA
γ − 1
γ − 1 (15)
D0 = TA
− 1
γ − 1 (16)
L0 = TA
γ(− 1)
γ − 1 (17)
E0 = TA
(γ − 1)
γ − 1 (18)
3.2.3 Banks Behaviour
Bank revenues are determined each period depending on the return on assets(ROA) which is
represented in the model by the exogenous parameter r. Once banks get their income, they
will use some part of this income to remunerate deposits and the remainder to increase their
equity. We model this allocation using another exogenous parameter η which characterize the
proportion of revenues that are capitalized. Consequently, in normal conditions the remaining
(1− η) is used to pay off deposits. In situations less favourable, in which banks are unable to
accomplish equity requirements, they will not remunerate depositors and will transform all the
income to equity. Or what is the same, they will switch to a new state where η = 1 .
To calculate interest rate paid to depositors (Rt) we need to subtract the retained earnings
from the obtained revenue, and distribute it among all deposits, as shown in equation (19).
Therefore, household i receives a pay-off (Pit) on time t which is Rt times its deposits (Dit)
as shown in equation (20).
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Rt = r
At
Dt
(1− η) (19)
Pit = RtDit (20)
In addition, this remuneration is paid in accordance with the liquidity preferences of de-
positors. So, a percentage c of their remuneration is paid in cash, resulting in a reduction
of liquidity. While the remaining (1 − c) is deposited in their accounts, thus increasing bank
deposits and leaving liquidity intact.
Another two determinant factors that define how banks behave are equity and reserve
ratio:
Equity ratio() is the relative proportion of equity that banks use to finance their assets.
This ratio indicates how much leveraged a bank is since it represents the proportion of assets
financed with own resources as opposed to those purchased through debt. So, less leveraged
banks will present higher  values, as opposed a  = 0 situation would mean that assets are
fully financed with liabilities. Moving on to liquidity, reserve ratio (γ) is defined as the fraction
of deposits that a bank holds as cash reserves. It represents the fraction of deposits that
households have to demand in order to exhaust bank liquidity reserves.
At a legislative level, trying to ensure some robustness, policy makers establish minimum
thresholds for these ratios that banks may accomplish. In our model we characterize those
minimum levels (min and γmin) as exogenous parameters. Playing with these values, the
model will allow us to reproduce different stylized legislative frameworks.
Given the policy rules and their actual balance sheet, once banks obtain their financial
revenue they follow a simple rule in order to maximize their profits: buy as many assets as
system conditions allow them. In plain words, if a certain period a bank does not accomplish
capital or liquidity restrictions, it will not buy assets, trying to improve their situation. If on the
contrary, both restrictions are met, it will buy as many assets as it can under the condition
that the balance sheet structure resulting of these operations must continue fulfilling the es-
tablished policy requirements. Analytically, at the end of each period banks have to decide
how much liquidity are going to transform in assets. Through this relationship −∆Lt = ∆At
and subject to:
Lt + ∆Lt
Dt
=
Lt+1
Dt+1
= t+1 ≥ min (21)
Et
Et + ∆At
=
Et+1
At+1
= γt+1 ≥ γmin (22)
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Is possible to conclude that the maximum amount of dispensable liquidity is defined by the
following inequation:
(−∆Lt)max ≤ Lt − γminDt (23)
So, if (−∆Lt)max is a positive number, it means that it is possible for the bank to spend that
amount of liquidity (or less) on buying assets while still respecting the cash reserve rule. If it is
a negative number, it indicates that the bank is under the threshold and that it will be needed
that amount of liquidity to accomplish cash requirements again.
Performing the same analysis on the equity over assets restriction, it can be proved that
maximum allowed asset variation given the endogenous variables is:
(∆At)
max ≤ Et
min
−At (24)
There, a positive (∆At)max represent the quantity of assets that can be bought without braking
the minimum capital requirements rule. As before, a negative number represents that the bank
is not accomplishing the requirements and indicates the "exceed of assets" for the given equity.
Summing up, the asset variation due to bank purchases could be expressed as the follow-
ing equation:
∆Apt =

min((−∆Lt)max, (∆At)max) if (−∆Lt)max > 0 and (∆At)max > 0
0 if (−∆Lt)max ≤ 0 or (∆At)max ≤ 0
(25)
Therefore, if requirements permit it, banks will buy as many assets as they were allowed by
the strictest restriction ie min((−∆Lt)max, (∆At)max) . On the contrary, in a situation where
(−∆Lt)max > 0 but (∆At)max ≤ 0 capital requirements prevent the purchase of any assets
no matter that it is possible to buy more assets without crossing the cash ratio threshold. In the
same way, asset acquisition is prevented when capital requirements allow it but cash reserve
ratio does not. Obviously if both ((−∆Lt)max and (∆At)max are negative — so neither capital
nor reserve ratios are fulfilled— any asset will be also bought.
So, dynamic equations that represent bank capitalization, deposit remuneration and asset
purchasing decisions are:
At+1 = At + ∆A
p
t (26)
Lt+1 = Lt + (1− c)rAt −Apt (27)
Dt+1 = (1− c)(1− η)rAt (28)
Et+1 = Et + ηr At (29)
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Examining the equations, we can observe how these variables interact:
First and obviously, assets on next period depend on how many assets are bought on the
current one as shown in equation (26).
Second, according with equation (27), liquidity variation has a negative relationship with c
and Apt . Higher values of households liquidity preference increases the amount of dividends
paid in cash hence it implies less liquidity accumulation. The other relationship is more simple,
the more assets a bank purchases in a period the less remaining liquidity it will hold at the
beginning of the next one.
Third, as shown in equation (28) deposit evolution depends negatively on c, because
higher liquidity preferences imply that less profits are paid through deposits. And η which rep-
resents that the more earnings a bank retain the less profits are distributed among depositors.
Fourth, equity accumulation, described in equation (29), is directly proportional to η. Logi-
cally higher capitalization of revenue implies higher equity accumulation.
In last place, it is worth mentioning that the return on assets ratio r has a positive and direct
relationship with liquidity, deposits and equity evolution but its relation with assets evolution
is not so direct. Logically, higher returns expand banks purchasing capability but legislative
requirements also play an important role.
3.3 Agents Interaction
3.3.1 Households-Households Interaction
With the intention to analyse the effect of widespread panic situations in the main variables of
the model a simple herding mechanism has been implemented as follows:
pwt = p
w
0 + ρmt (30)
In order to avoid ad-hoc assumptions, we establish that the probability of deciding to with-
draw (pwt ) money depends on how many withdrawals have been in the previous period, on the
basic withdrawal probability parameter (pw0 ) and in an exogenous parameter ρ. This allows us
to exogenously adjust the impact that general feeling has in each individual decisions. The
endogenous variable m ∈ [−1, 1] can be understood as a "panic level" indicator. And it is
calculated as follows:
mt =
depositst−1 − witdrawst−1
depositst−1 + witdrawst−1
Thus, m = −1 (m = 1) indicates the more optimistic (pessimistic) scenario where the
probability that a household decide to withdraw is ρ times smaller (higher) than the initial
probability.
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3.3.2 Central Bank-Banks Interaction
The last interaction we found in the model is the one that takes place between the central bank
and the other banks. If there is central bank acting as a lender of last resort, a bank that suffers
a shock of liquidity will not be forced to fire-sell assets. Instead, if cash reserve and equity
requirements are fulfilled, central bank will provide enough liquidity to cover the shortage. This
condition acts as an incentive for banks to meet the requirements. At the current stage of the
model, we focus our attention on the implications that a LOLR could have in our fundamental
variables but forthcoming amendments could broaden the spectrum of possibilities.
We would like to propose to introduce debt dynamics in the model. This would enable it to
analyse the consequences of debt in the system as well as its relationship with our fundamen-
tal variables. The possibility of implementing this improvement in upcoming works remains
open.
In the same way, we propose to increase the complexity of the system implementing an
interbank market. In our opinion, this is the next step to follow if we intend to fully understand
the problem of liquidity shocks and how policy decisions could help us to prevent them.
However, some interesting conclusions have been drown from the actual model.
3.3.3 Households-Banks Interaction
As we have seen so far, most important interaction happens between households and banks.
Most of the components of this interaction have been explained above but summarizing, it
could be said that the aggregate demand of liquidity is constructed adding individual house-
hold demands. So, this net withdrawal demand, forces banks to readjust their balances to
attend petitions as well as to accomplish capital and liquidity requirements.
4 Simulation Results
The agent-based computational model described in previous sections enables us to study
some qualitative features of the relationship between banks, households and central-bank.
Depending on the characteristics to study we have launched four general typologies of exper-
iments. First experiments are designed in order to study the relationship between the system
robustness and capital () and liquidity (γ) requirements. On the next experiment, we focus
our attention on the effect that inequality has on the robustness of the financial system and
by extension over all the artificial economy. The third configuration replicates a crisis situation
where banks receive a shock on their assets value at the same time that the growth rate falls
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drastically. The simulations also allow us to compare two different scenarios: one with a CB
acting as a lender of last resource and another one with a CB acting via regulation. In the
last experimental framework a stylized herding effect has been implemented. We analysed
the effects of these coordination failures on system stability measuring the variations on the
defaulting time of the banks and as well as the impact on the growth rate.
4.1 Comparing the Impact of Capital and Liquidity Requirements
This first experiment models an extreme situation which pushes banks to bankruptcy. Each
bank is connected to 10 households. Each family deposits or withdraws 2% of its wealth each
period(α = 0.02). Banks are initialized in a standard5 parametrization where 0 = 0.1 and
γ0 = 0.01. In each run a particular regulation framework is modelled varying parameters
γ = 0.01, 0.02, · · · , 1 and  = 0.06, 0.08, · · · , 0.16.. Thus, the parameters grid is representing
situations with lax regulations (γ = 0.01,  = 0.06 on the more permissive extreme) and others
more restrictive (γ = 0.1,  = 0.16 on the more restrictive extreme) as well as situations where
one policy tool is being used more restrictively than the other. To determine the capacity to
avoid bankruptcy of each set-up, we measure the average time6 it takes banks7 to default. As
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Mean of Defaulting time for each (γ, )
5Standard in the sense that in each execution is initialized with the same parameters. We should understand
the model as a first qualitative approach. The empirical validation remains open for new work.
6Measured in simulation steps
7At this preliminary version, the model have not interactions among banks. In addition, each household have
its deposits in a single bank
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As it can be appreciated, the slope of the graphic is oriented, roughly, parallel to capital
requirements axis. So,  affects the robustness of the system in a clearly greater way than
γ. From the results of the simulations we can conclude that limiting banks leverage through
capital requirements in order to avoid bankruptcies is more effective than forcing them to keep
liquidity reserves. In order to quantify this difference we construct a performance indicator(φ)
that represents the share of the best performance that a particular set-up has. For each pair
(γ, ) the average bankruptcy time (T¯ b,γ) is divided by the average default time of the best
parameter combination (Max(T¯ b) as shown in Equation 31.
φ,γ =
T¯ b,γ
Max(T¯ b)
(31)
Results are shown in Figure 3. Colours have been added for an easier visual understand-
ing. Red tones represent worst performances while green ones indicate the best ones. It
is easy to see that poor (good) results predominate in the firsts (last) columns, which repre-
sent low (high)  values. As opposed, performance variation between rows is not clear. It
can be concluded that our model presents major robustness improvements with  than with γ
variations.
Figure 3: Performance score φγ,
4.2 Cash Reserve Requirements in Presence of Higher Liquidity hocks
The experiment above has shown that cash requirements are relatively less determinant than
capital requirements in order to prevent bankruptcies. Another interesting finding is that if we
expand the scale of liquidity shocks enough, cash requirements become irrelevant in deter-
mining default times. To show this, we set-up an experiment similar to the one above but
in which three levels of demand (α= 0.02, α=0.03 and α=0.04) have been simulated. Con-
cretely, this simulation is composed by the same parameter ranges than the first experiment
(γ between 0.01 and 1, and  between 0.06 and 0.16) but in order to lighten the computational
effort we have reduced the number of banks of each parametrization to 20.
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Conceptually, higher levels of α represent more turbulent environments, where households
deposits and withdraws are more pronounced and therefore more stress is created on the
financial system. Our model suggests that in this kind of scenarios regulations through capital
requirements may be more appropriated.
The prevailing dynamics behind this phenomenon is as follows: having more equity in
relation to their assets puts banks in a stronger position to resist assets fire-selling before de-
faulting. In addition, with low cash fluctuations, it is possible to partially prevent the fire-selling
of assets by increasing the available liquidity buffer. As the only equity reducing mechanism
are those sales, if banks succeed in avoiding them, they could improve their defaulting times.
However, if cash fluctuations are high enough, cash reserves lose their effectiveness and
capital requirements become the only relevant default prevention mechanism.
The output of this experiment is analysed in Table 1. It shows 4 regressions where the
explained variable (Steps) measures the steps it takes banks to default and the explicative
ones are the studied parameters: α,,γ. Parameter α represent the percentage of their wealth
that households withdraw each period and parameters  and γ represent the regulatory levels
of capital and liquidity requirements.
Regresion (1) includes all the observations while the other three regressions only include
one alpha level each one. Qualitatively speaking, all relevant variables present the expected
signs i.e, higher requirements imply higher defaulting times and in regression (1) higher tur-
bulences have a negative effect on the system robustness. In regressions (3) and (4) it is
possible to see evidences of the phenomenon previously described. Coefficients of param-
eter γ become non significant presenting p-values far higher than 5%. Thus, we find that
liquidity requirements have a limited capacity to stabilize this economy, especially when fluc-
tuations are higher. Epsilon coefficients decrease in the measure that liquidity shocks become
more pronounced. In this sense, the economic interpretation is straight forward, even more
efficient tools, as equity over assets limitations, become less effective when the system is
exposed to higher fluctuations.
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Table 1: Time it takes banks to default depending on regulation variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
α = 0.02 α = 0.03 α = 0.04
Steps Steps Steps Steps
α −274382.5∗∗∗
(12936.6)
 (Capital Requirements) 55062.7∗∗∗ 107025.0∗∗∗ 68730.5∗∗∗ 29621.4∗∗∗
(3207.9) (9058.3) (5478.0) (3673.2)
γ (Cash Reserve Requirements) 8348.1∗ 39389.3∗∗∗ −2839.0 861.9
(3518.7) (8066.5) (6054.3) (4348.9)
Constant 5625.1∗∗∗ −5572.1∗∗∗ −3955.6∗∗∗ −2003.4∗∗∗
(497.3) (908.1) (663.4) (468.3)
Observations 1427 343 508 576
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4.3 Inequality Matters
Our model treats inequality through an exogenous parameter that allows us to compare dif-
ferent distributions of wealth among families. As already mentioned, our approach aims to
stylize the phenomenon of inequality in a qualitative way. Simulations confirm that inequality
affects negatively both default probability and growth rate of the economy. We run 80 different
set-ups where wealth share is represented as a normal distribution centred on the initial aver-
age wealth (W¯i0) and with different standard deviations.The most unequal scenario presents a
standard deviation equal to its mean, and the most equal distribution presents a standard error
0.2 times this value. There are M = 50 banks each one connected to Nj = 10 households.
The growth rate of the economy is r = 0.005 and the fire-sell cost is l = 0.25. Regulation
parameters are adjusted as follows: γ = 0.01,  = 0.1.
In order to understand the impact of inequality on the main variables, two OLS regressions
are presented in Table 2. In the first regression (1) we focus our attention on how sigma affects
the time it takes banks to default (Step). As it can be seen, both effects — lineal and quadratic
— are relevant at a 1% level of significance. The existence of a quadratic effect could be
graphically appreciated in Figure 4. The appearance of this exponential relationship points
that the effects over the default probability of a growing inequality are worse in initially less
unequal populations.
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Looking at regression (2), where the total wealth generated in the simulation (tw) is re-
gressed over our inequality parameters, it is possible to observe that conclusions are roughly
similar. The graphical representation of the effect of inequality on growth is shown in the
Figure 5.
Thus, the effects observed in this section are consistent with the stylized facts we intend
to describe, which could be interpreted as a qualitative validation of the model.
Table 2: Effects of Inequality on robustness and growth
(1) (2)
[step] tw
σ2 5122.7∗∗ 1275659.6∗∗∗
(1834.6) (124865.3)
σ −9685.9∗∗∗ −1173859.0∗∗∗
(2273.7) (141227.7)
Constant 8786.0∗∗∗ 228887.7∗∗∗
(640.3) (34133.6)
Observations 3505 595
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 4: Time it takes banks to default depending on inequality levels
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Figure 5: Growth levels achieved by surviving banks depending on inequality levels
4.4 The Central Bank as a Lender of Last Resource
In this analysis, we pretend to simulate a crisis situation where banks face at the same time a
decrease of growth rate that places their return on assets close to 0 and a shock on the value
of their assets. Starting from the same pre-crisis regulation, we pretend to describe the effects
on economic growth of different policies adopted on crisis periods. Runs are composed by
M = 100 banks each one connected to Nj = 10 households. Initial capital and cash ratios
are characterized by γ = 0.01 and  = 0.1. In addition there is a central bank that can act
as lender of last resource. The crisis begins on period 1200, and the output of the model is
the total growth of economy after 5000 periods (tw). This could be interpreted as a proxy of
the capacity of the system to recover from a punctual crisis and return to its growth path. We
experiment with different capital requirements levels () and with the existence of a LOLR that
covers liquidity shortage during the crisis period.
The experiment described in this section is divided in two stages: pre-crisis and post-crisis.
In the pre-crisis one, banks adapt their initial balance sheets — which are equal for all banks
and all runs — to the new capital requirements determined by . In this first 1200 periods
stage, the general economy parameters are: r = 0.005 and l = 0.10.
The crisis is represented by an 8% diminution on the asset value of each bank ∆Aj =
−0.08 and by a very low return on assets (ROA) (r = 0.0001). The next 3800 periods com-
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pose the post-crisis stage where central bank plays a determinant role. If a bank accom-
plishes policy requirements, it could ask for liquidity to CB. Thus, given the case that the bank
could not attend households liquidity demands, fire-selling dynamics are avoided facilitating
the economy to continue its growth path. At the end of these 5000 periods, the total wealth
generated by the economy is stored in our tw variable.
Our model does not include inflation dynamics to describe the effects on prices of this
expansion of the money supply but this analysis is beyond the objective of this work although
it could be implemented in future versions.
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Figure 6: Total Wealth on crisis scenarios with and without LOLR depending on 
Looking at the results of the simulations, represented in Figure 4.4, it is clear that the
action of a CB as a lender of last resource changes the direction of the effect that capital
requirements present on the economy growth. If banks can borrow from the CB in case of
liquidity shortages, they become able to construct successfully more leveraged portfolios.
And this allows them to take advantage of the economy growth more efficiently. As opposed,
if the CB only acts by the regulatory way the effect of rising capital requirements works on the
other way. If banks cannot borrow money from the CB, having higher capital requirements
help them to absorb the shock on their balances. In other words, the loss of equity due to
a reduction of assets value is proportionally smaller in less leveraged banks. What is clear
is that the presence of a lender of last resort makes it more profitable for banks to get more
leveraged. This can suggest a potential danger in performing long-standing money supply
expansions by a lender of last resource.
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4.5 Panic and Bank Runs
The latter phenomenon studied in this paper is the effect of systemic panic on the economy.
Our model reproduces this stylized effect on the line of Diamond & Dybvig as a coordination
failure among depositors. This experiment reproduces the effects that different coordination
parameter values (ρ ∈ [0, 50]) have on the system. Technically ρ is the percentage points
that are added to the basic withdraw probability of each family when the system is affected by
panic. As the basic probability is 50%, with ρ = 50, each household has a 100% probability to
perform a withdraw. On the contrary, ρ = 0 means that no herding effects among households
are present.
In order to isolate this effect, the rest of the parameters remain in a neutral position where
 = 0.1, γ = 0.01, r = 0.005 and l = 0.05. The simulation lasts for 20000 periods and
the variables of interest are: Step, which is the time it takes banks to default, measured in
simulation periods, and rtw, which is the wealth level of the economy as a fraction of the
initial one.
As Figure 7 shows, the observed effect coincides with the expected ones. Higher ρ values
imply that liquidity fluctuations in the economy become more abrupt forcing banks to use
fire-sell mechanisms more often. With enough coordination levels, banks are simply unable
to attend households liquidity petitions even fire-selling all their assets8 which leads them to
bankruptcy.
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Figure 7: Time it takes banks to default depending on coordination level
8The maximum liquidity that a bank could provide selling all its assets is (1− l)At
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Even when these mechanisms do not suppose banks’ default, the effects on growth are
also critical. As shown in Figure 8, the relationship between ρ and rtw is highly apprecia-
ble. With higher herding effects, households coordinate their behaviours provoking the net
aggregate withdrawal to reach higher values. When panic seizes the system, liquidity short-
age becomes inevitable. Thus, banks end up paying it with reductions on their equity as a
result of the already explained fire-sell mechanisms. On the contrary, when there is a general
feeling of confidence and households deposit all their wealth on banks the positive effect are
not too generous. Two effects are responsible for this: First fire-sell cost is higher than the
return on assets. This implies that the extra return obtained by the banks in the confidence
phases is less than the additional penalty suffered in the panic stages. And secondly, much of
the generated wealth is accumulated by households in the form of bank deposits. This gen-
erates a perverse mechanism where, on confidence phases, balance sheets get oversized
and much more leveraged. When the mood changes, and the system enters a panic stage,
households have more founds to withdraw in proportion with banks equity forcing them into
fire-sell dynamics more often.
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Figure 8: Growth on the economies with non-defaulted banks depending on coordination level
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5 Conclusions and Preliminary Policy Implications
In this paper, we introduced an agent based model of the banking system, including banks
households and a central bank. The model has shown able to address some relevant eco-
nomic issues regarding liquidity shocks, shocks on assets, inequality wealth distributions
among households and herding effects. By analysing the effects that different policy con-
figurations have on the system, we could affirm that capital requirements are more effective
than cash reserve restrictions in order to guarantee system robustness. Also, we find that
once a certain threshold of turbulence it exceeded, liquidity requirements become irrelevant.
Simulations including a central bank as a lender of last resource have shown that tightening
capital requirements affect growth rate on a negative way, as opposed as the positive effect
that it has when the lender of last resource is not present. The model has been also capable
of simulating scenarios with different wealth distributions showing that inequality has a nega-
tive effect in both stability and growth. Finally, bank runs have been studied applying simple
herding dynamics. As a result of these simulations, it can be concluded that having a herding
effect among households has harmful consequences: it makes financial system more fragile
and also it reduces the growing capability of the entire economy.
The Macroeconomic policy implications that emerge from the model should be taken pru-
dentially. The first conclusions that can be drawn from this study is that, in relatively stable
periods, liquidity constraints may favour the growth of the economy. In contrast, if a turbu-
lent period is expected, central bank can strengthen the financial system by increasing capital
requirements. Once the economy is on a crisis period central bank can stabilize the econ-
omy injecting liquidity to the financial system which could avoiding some bankruptcies. But
this mechanism generates incentives for the banks to get more leveraged which can put the
long-term stability of economy at risk.Finally, the negative effect of inequality suggests that the
application of redistributive policies may have a stabilizing effect on the system.
Looking forward, the fact that the results match our expectations could be considered as
a first validation step. Some extensions for the model have to be implemented in order to
add new features and improve the actual ones. Next steps in developing the model could be
introducing inflation mechanisms, interbank markets or more sophisticated herding dynamics.
These extensions could convert our partial equilibrium model in a general equilibrium one.
This will allow us to represent situations that now we can not examine and also understand
the phenomena we have studied with the current version with a more realistic approach.
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A Appendix I: NetLogo Code
Program used for generating simulations of interest is listed below.
breed [ banks bank ]
breed [ households household ]
undi rected−l i n k−breed [ r e l a t i o n s h i p s r e l a t i o n s h i p ]
r e l a t i o n s h i p s−own [ hh−w bank−money ]
banks−own [ A L D Eq K Km P R Cap demanded−w d e f a u l t ? dis tance−from−BP t o t a l−w
death−t i c k I v−A v−L v−D v−Eq i n i−A i n i−Eq L−bc Eqt−1]
households−own [ w myBank hh−cash hh−depos i t wealth−t ]
g loba ls [ n−of−defau l ted−banks run−n min−eoa i n i−tw cont eta wt−1 mood f i n a l−prob l
−gdp l−wg]
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; MAIN ACTIONS
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
to setup
c lear−a l l
reset−t i c k s
set−de fau l t−shape banks " square "
set−de fau l t−shape households " house "
set n−of−defau l ted−banks 0
setup−banks
setup−l i n k s
setup−households
set i n i−tw tw
ask banks [ se t i n i−A A set i n i−Eq Eq ]
set cont 0
end
to go
t i c k
end−vars
set wt−1 tw
i f e l s e mood−on [ set f i n a l−prob w−prob + ro ∗ mood ] [ se t f i n a l−prob w−prob ]
launch−households
launch−banks
hh−update
calc−mood
end
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; SETUPS ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
to setup−banks
set min−eoa ( ( i n i−equi ty−over−assets ∗ ( i n i− l i q u i d i t y −r a t i o − 1) ) / ( ( i n i− l i q u i d i t y
−r a t i o ∗ i n i−equ i ty−over−assets ) − 1) )
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create−banks number−of−banks
ask banks [ setxy random−xcor random−ycor set death−t i c k "NA" ]
ask banks [ create−c−network ]
ask banks [
se t Eq TA ∗ min−eoa
set D TA ∗ (1 − min−eoa )
set A TA ∗ ( min−eoa / i n i−equ i ty−over−assets )
se t L TA ∗ ( 1 − ( min−eoa / i n i−equi ty−over−assets ) )
se t R roa ∗ A / D
set d e f a u l t ? False
set l−bc 0
set Eqt−1 0
]
end
to setup−l i n k s
ask r e l a t i o n s h i p s [ se t hh−w 0]
end
to setup−households
ask households [
l e t avg−wealth ( ( [ D] o f myBank / (1 − c ) ) / hh−per−bank )
set hh−cash c ∗ avg−wealth
set hh−depos i t ( ( 1 − c ) ∗ avg−wealth )
]
setup−households−normal
end
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; LAUNCHES ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
to launch−households
ask households [ i f e l s e any? my−l i n k s
[ se t w decided−w demand w]
[ ]
]
end
to launch−banks
ask banks [ i f e l s e d e f a u l t ?
[ ]
[ i f e l s e (Eq / A) < Equi ty−over−assets [ se t eta 1 ] [ se t eta standard−eta ]
se t eqt−1 eq
c a p i t a l i z e−d i s t r i b u t e
at tend−p e t i t i o n s
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i f e l s e K >= 0 [ go−normal ] [
i f e l s e cb = " p a r c i a l " [
ask−cb ]
[ t ime−to−s e l l ]
]
check−d e f a u l t
se t Km K
set K 0
]
]
ask banks [ se t l a b e l p r e c i s i o n (Eq / A) 2 ]
end
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; HOUSEHOLDS RELATED
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
to−r e p o r t decided−w
l e t _w ( alpha ) ∗ wealth−t
i f e l s e random 101 <= f i n a l−prob [
i f e l s e _w <= hh−depos i t [ r e p o r t _w ] [
r e p o r t hh−depos i t ]
] [
i f e l s e _w <= hh−cash [
r e p o r t (−1 ∗ _w) ] [
r e p o r t (−1 ∗ hh−cash ) ]
]
end
to demand [w−value ] ;<−−−−−−−−− cambiar nombre a " withdraw "
ask l i n k−wi th myBank [ set hh−w w−value ]
end
to hh−update
ask households [
i f any? my−l i n k s [
se t hh−cash hh−cash + [ bank−money ] o f l i n k−wi th myBank
set hh−depos i t hh−depos i t − [ bank−money ] o f l i n k−wi th myBank
set wealth−t hh−cash + hh−depos i t ]
]
end
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; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; BANKS RELATED ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
to create−c−network
l e t g (360 / hh−per−bank )
l e t n 0
hatch−households hh−per−bank [
set myBank mysel f l e f t ( g ∗ n ) fd 2 + random−f l o a t 2 set n n + 1 create−
r e l a t i o n s h i p−wi th mysel f ]
end
to at tend−p e t i t i o n s
set demanded−w reduce + [ hh−w] o f my−l i n k s
set K L − demanded−w
end
to go−normal
set D D − demanded−w
set L K
ask my−l i n k s [ se t bank−money hh−w]
; A y E permanecen constantes
end
to time−to−s e l l
se t D D + K − L
l i q u i d a t e−assets
set L 0
set Eq Eq + ( l i q u i d a t i o n−cost ∗ K) / ( 1 − l i q u i d a t i o n−cost )
ask my−l i n k s [ se t bank−money hh−w]
end
to l i q u i d a t e−assets ; <−−Restr inge alcanzar assets negat ivos
i f e l s e (A + (K / (1 − l i q u i d a t i o n−cost ) ) <= 0 ) [ se t A 0 ] [ se t A A + (K / (1 −
l i q u i d a t i o n−cost ) )
]
end
to ask−cb
set D D − L
set L 0
set l−bc l−bc + (K ∗ −1)
ask my−l i n k s [ se t bank−money hh−w]
end
to check−d e f a u l t
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i f Eq <= 0 . 1 [ set d e f a u l t ? True set n−of−defau l ted−banks n−of−defau l ted−banks + 1
set death−t i c k t i c k s ask my−r e l a t i o n s h i p s [ d ie ] ]
end
to c a p i t a l i z e−d i s t r i b u t e
set I roa ∗ A
l e t Eq−temp Eq + ( eta ∗ I ) ; se r i a l o mismo c a l c u l a r E = A + L − D ( Comprobado en
excel )
se t D D + (1 − eta ) ∗ (1 − c ) ∗ I
l e t Del taL I ∗ (1 + c ∗ ( eta − 1) ) ; comprobado en excel tambiÃl’n
l e t L−temp L + DeltaL
l e t DeltaAmax (Eq / equ i ty−over−assets ) − A
l e t −DeltaLmax ( ( l i q u i d i t y −r a t i o ∗ D) − L−temp ) ∗ −1
l e t Lbc DeltaAmax − −DeltaLmax
l e t +debt 0
i f e l s e cb = " t o t a l " and (Eq / A) >= equi ty−over−assets [
i f e l s e DeltaAmax <= 0[
set co l o r red
set L L−temp
]
[ i f e l s e −DeltaLmax <= DeltaAmax [ set A A + DeltaAMax set L L−temp − −DeltaLmax
set D D + Lbc set co l o r v i o l e t se t +debt Lbc ]
[
se t L L−temp − DeltaAmax
set A A + DeltaAmax set co l o r green ]
i f −DeltaLmax < 0 [ set co l o r b lack ]
]
]
; Cuando e l BC no actua
[
i f e l s e DeltaAmax <= 0 or −DeltaLmax <= 0[
i f e l s e DeltaAmax <= 0 [ set co l o r red ] [ se t co l o r cyan ]
set L L−temp ]
[ i f e l s e −DeltaLmax <= DeltaAmax [ set A A + −DeltaLMax set L L−temp − −DeltaLmax
set co l o r blue ]
[
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set L L−temp − DeltaAmax
set A A + DeltaAmax set co l o r green ]
]
]
ask l i n k−neighbors [ l e t Payof f (1 − eta ) ∗ ( [ I ] o f myBank / [D] o f myBank ) ∗ hh−
depos i t
se t hh−depos i t hh−depos i t + Payof f ∗ (1 − c )
set hh−cash hh−cash + Payof f ∗ c ]
se t Eq A + L − D
set l−bc l−bc + +debt
end
to d i s t r i b u t e
ask l i n k−neighbors [
se t hh−depos i t hh−depos i t ∗ (1 + [R] o f mysel f )
]
se t Eq A + L − D
end
to−r e p o r t endog−roa
; ( ( 3 0∗ s in (0 .1 x +2.8) +30) / ( 2∗ ( x+100) ) or ( 1 . 5 / ( 0 . 1 x+10) ) ∗ ( s in (0 .1 x +2.8) +1) or 1 .5∗ (
s in (0 .1 x +2.8) +1) / ( 0 . 1 x+10) EN RADIANES HAY QUE CONVERTIR A GRADOS! ! !
r e p o r t ( ( 1 . 5 ∗ ( s in ( (18 / p i ) ∗ t i c k s + 2 .8 ) + 1) / ( 0 .1 ∗ t i c k s + 14) ) / 10)
end
to−r e p o r t endog−roa2
r e p o r t ( ( 2 . 6 ∗ ( s in ( (27 / p i ) ∗ t i c k s + 1) + 1) / ( t i c k s + 50) ) / 100)
end
to−r e p o r t endog− l
r e p o r t ( roa ∗ −20) + 0.5
end
to−r e p o r t endog−l 2
r e p o r t ( roa ∗ −400) + 0.8
end
to−r e p o r t death−t i c k s
r e p o r t [ death−t i c k ] o f banks
end
to−r e p o r t t1
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r e p o r t min [ death−t i c k ] o f banks
end
to−r e p o r t t2
r e p o r t max [ death−t i c k ] o f banks
end
to−r e p o r t end− l i q u i d i t y −cost
r e p o r t ((−20 ∗ roa ) + 0 .5 )
end
to−r e p o r t calc−min−e [ l i q−r ]
r e p o r t equ i ty−over−assets ∗ ( l i q−r − 1) / ( ( equ i ty−over−assets ∗ l i q−r ) − 1)
end
to show−e
ask banks [ show Eq / A ]
end
to end−vars
i f roa−mode = 1 [
set roa endog−roa
set l i q u i d a t i o n−cost endog− l ]
i f roa−mode = 2 [
set roa endog−roa2
set l i q u i d a t i o n−cost endog−l 2 ]
i f roa−mode = 3 [
set roa 0.001
set l i q u i d a t i o n−cost 0 . 6 ]
end
to setup−households−normal
ask banks [ setup−wealth ]
ask households [ se t hh−cash wealth−t ∗ c set hh−depos i t wealth−t ∗ (1 − c ) ]
end
to−r e p o r t values−vec to r [ n nu sigma ] ; <− Genera una l i s t a con n va lo res
d i s t r i b u i d o s como una normal cuya media es exactamente nu . Genera n−1 y fuerza
e l u l t imo .
i f e l s e n > 1 [
l e t _ l i s t n−values ( n − 1) [ random−normal nu sigma ]
l e t t_nu mean _ l i s t
l e t l a s t−va l ( nu ∗ n ) − ( ( n − 1) ∗ ( t_nu ) )
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set _ l i s t l p u t l a s t−va l _ l i s t
r e p o r t _ l i s t ]
[ r e p o r t nu ]
end
to gen−checked−vec to r [ n nu sigma ]
l e t vec to r values−vec to r n nu sigma
set vec to r s o r t vec to r
i f e l s e f i r s t vec to r >= 0 [ ]
[ gen−checked−vec to r n nu sigma ]
end
to setup−wealth ; l a r iqueza media segun los deposi tos es ( [D] o f myBank / (1 − c )
) / n o f hh
set cont cont + 1
l e t pos 0
l e t avg−b−wealth (D / (1 − c ) ) / hh−per−bank
l e t sigma avg−b−wealth ∗ sigma−mult
l e t vec to r values−vec to r hh−per−bank avg−b−wealth sigma
set vec to r s o r t vec to r
i f e l s e cont < 1000
[
i f e l s e f i r s t vec to r <= 0 [ setup−wealth ]
[
; p r i n t vec to r
ask l i n k−neighbors [
se t wealth−t i tem pos vec to r
set pos pos + 1] ]
] [ p r i n t " E r ro r " ]
end
to ba l
ask banks [ p r i n t ( word " \ n " " ∗∗∗∗ Period " t i c k s " ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗\n "
"A= " p r e c i s i o n A 2 " D= " p re c i s i o n D 2 " \ n "
" L= " p r e c i s i o n L 2 " Eq=" p re c i s i o n Eq 2 " \ n "
"K=" K " \ n " " Demanded W = " demanded−w " \ n "
" To ta l A " p r e c i s i o n (A + L ) 2 " \ n "
" To ta l P " p r e c i s i o n (D + Eq) 2 " \ n " )
i f e l s e Eq != 0 and A != 0 [ p r i n t word " Equ i ty over Assets= " p r e c i s i o n (Eq / A) 4 ] [
p r i n t " cero " ] ]
end
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to obal
ask banks [ output−p r i n t ( word " \ n " " ∗∗∗∗ Period " t i c k s " ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗\n "
"A= " p r e c i s i o n A 2 " D= " p re c i s i o n D 2 " \ n "
" L= " p r e c i s i o n L 2 " Eq=" p re c i s i o n Eq 2 " \ n "
"K=" Km " \ n " " Demanded W = " demanded−w " \ n "
" To ta l A " p r e c i s i o n (A + L ) 2 " \ n "
" To ta l P " p r e c i s i o n (D + Eq) 2 " \ n " )
i f e l s e Eq != 0 and A != 0 [ output−p r i n t ( word " Equ i ty over Assets= " p r e c i s i o n (Eq /
A) 4 " \ n "
" L /D= " p r e c i s i o n ( L / D) 4) ] [ p r i n t " cero " ]
output−p r i n t word " Death Tick " death−t i c k
output−p r i n t " \ n∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗"]
end
to−r e p o r t tw
l e t v 0
ask banks [ se t v v + (Eq + D) ]
ask households [ se t v v + hh−cash ]
r e p o r t v
end
to−r e p o r t r−tw
r e p o r t tw / i n i−tw
end
to−r e p o r t repor t−aw
l e t l−wealth [ ]
ask households [ se t l−wealth l p u t wealth−t l−wealth ]
r e p o r t mean l−wealth
end
to−r e p o r t wg
r e p o r t ( tw − wt−1) / wt−1
end
to−r e p o r t gdp
r e p o r t ( tw − wt−1)
end
to−r e p o r t debt
r e p o r t [ l−bc / Eq ] o f bank 0
end
to−r e p o r t del taEq . bank [ number ]
r e p o r t ( [ Eq ] o f bank number / [ Eqt−1] o f bank number ) − 1
end
to calc−mood
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l e t vec [w] o f households
l e t dep 0
foreach vec [ i f ? <= 0 [ set dep dep + 1 ] ]
l e t r e t hh−per−bank − dep
set mood ( r e t − dep ) / hh−per−bank
end
to−r e p o r t bw−hhw
l e t bw 0
l e t hhw 0
ask banks [ se t bw bw + Eq ]
ask households [ se t hhw hhw + hh−cash + hh−depos i t ]
r e p o r t (bw / hhw)
end
to−r e p o r t pbw
l e t bw 0
l e t hhw 0
ask banks [ se t bw bw + Eq ]
ask households [ se t hhw hhw + hh−cash + hh−depos i t ]
r e p o r t bw / (bw + hhw)
end
to−r e p o r t phhw
l e t bw 0
l e t hhw 0
ask banks [ se t bw bw + Eq ]
ask households [ se t hhw hhw + hh−cash + hh−depos i t ]
r e p o r t hhw / (bw + hhw)
end
37
B Appendix II: NetLogo Environment
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